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Abstract: Ever since the beginning of its first term in 2002, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has been influencing the media in order to 
curtail and circumvent independent journalism in Turkey. This repression 
on media freedom in the last fifteen years indicates democratic regression 
in Turkey. A free press is vital to any democracy, allowing for constructive 
public debate while also holding government accountable. Nonetheless, 
rather than establishing a secure and independent space for the press, the 
government has formed an environment that is contentious and even 
threatening for journalists to report opposing views. In addition, the unruly 
government proceedings toward news media have primarily been led by 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, now the President of Turkey, 
establishing an intimidating, powerful media autocracy. This article 
explores Turkey’s current state of declining freedoms of the press as the 
government has employed different strategies to suppress the media’s role 
in Turkey, including approaches of controlling media monopolies, 
alongside the incarceration, intimidation and dismissing of journalists. It 
also provides an illustration of the government’s media surveillance 
through different backgrounds and occasions, confirming not only its 
obstinacy of government criticism, but also its apprehension of the media’s 
power to induce anti-AKP sentiments. 
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Introduction 
 
More evidence from the past decade shows that the pace of 
democratization, which was used as one of the main political arguments for 
the strengthening of the AKP, was rather rhetorical, than a real policy on 
the agenda. Various groups that constitute political opposition became the 
target of government control and oppression. In parallel, there have been 
serious attempts by the government to reduce the existing human rights 
laws, women's rights, the right to free expression, the freedom of the press, 
and efforts to politicize the judiciary. Despite the fact that these 
shortcomings were highlighted in the reports of international bodies, such 
as the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the UN, Erdoğan 
continues to give speeches handling these issues, which in turn have 
accentuated public weariness.1 
The same government adopted controversial laws that no longer 
followed the objectives of European integration. On May 24th 2013, the 
Turkish Parliament voted the text of a law restricting the consumption, sale 
and advertising of alcoholic beverages, which sparked a lot of criticism 
from the Turkish population. The adoption of this law was seen as the 
beginning of a state Islamization plan initiated by Erdoğan, who was 
subsequently accused of authoritarian drift. 
                                                           
1 Gareth Jenkins, Erdogan, the AKP and the Repercussions of the Gezi Park Protests, July 
3rd 2013, accessed on June 25th 2017 at http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-
analyst-articles/item/49-erdo%C4%9Fan-the-akp-and-the-repercussions-of-the-gezi-park-
protests.html.  
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This drastic limitation of alcohol consumption was just one of the 
measures taken with the aim of more or less concealing the return of Turkey 
to the traditional Islamic model - the project to ban abortion, encourage 
natality, reorganize primary education in order to re-open religious colleges, 
the project of building a large mosque etc. 
Erdoğan's pro-Islamist propaganda, who wanted to form future 
pious generations, especially by reopening religious colleges and 
introducing more optional religion classes into school curriculum, irritated 
those bound to kemalist secularism. More and more questions arose about 
the existence of a hidden program of the Islamic government of the Turkish 
state. Under Erdoğan's rule, Turkey has moved further away from Europe, 
investing in recovering the glory years of the Ottoman Empire. The 
aggressive policy of the current president has long been characterized as 
“neo-Ottomanism”2. It is true that the accession negotiations with the 
European Union have also begun under Erdoğan's rule, but, following his 
many contrived decisions, the confidence of the Turkish population in the 
European institutions has diminished drastically. 
 
The “Gezi Resistace”: The Ups and Downs of Press Freedom 
 
I have chosen the case of the Gezi Resistance in order to show how 
the street demonstrations that dominated Turkey in the summer of 2013 
were, by their nature, examples of propaganda resistance. 
                                                           
2 Metin Heper, Sabri Sayari, The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey, Abington, 
Routledge Handbooks, 2012, p. 177. 
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I would begin with the current definition of the Turkish state as 
“Kemalist”, “secular” and “nationalist”,3 three fundamental concepts in the 
1982 Constitution, the one still in office, but imposed by the junta led by 
General Kenan Evren after the military coup in September 12th, 1980.4 The 
coup established the so-called Kemalist elite at the top of the political 
hierarchy in Turkey, a fanatical defender of the concepts mentioned above. 
This “establishing” strengthened these elites in the bureaucracy of the state, 
including education, the armed forces and internal security forces, including 
police and constabulary.5 
Since 1960 until now,  Turkey  has experienced  three  direct  
military  interventions  when the  military  has  taken power into its own  
hands (1960,  1971  and  1980)6  and  another  military intervention in 1997, 
in which case the army, with the tacit support of some public   and   private   
institutions   and   civil   social  groups, forced the Welfare Party 
government (AKP’s predecessor) to resign. It is important to state that the 
Turkish army only intervened when the secular republic seemed 
threatened.7 
                                                           
3 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
1982, accessed on June 3rd 2017 at https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf. 
4 Mesut Özcan, Understanding The “New‟ Turkish Foreign Policy:  Changes Within 
Continuity, Is Turkey   Departing From The West, International Strategic Research 
Organization, accessed on June 8th 2017 at 
http://www.usak.org.tr/images_upload/files/makale7-2011.pdf. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Antonello Biagini, Storia della Turchia Contemporanea, Milano, Bompiam, 2002, p. 26. 
7 Radu Gabriel Safta, Călin Felezeu, Turcia contemporană între moştenirea kemalistă şi 
Uniunea Europeană, Cluj-Napoca, CA Publishing, 2011, p. 74. 
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On May 28th 2013, in the wake of population discontent with the 
plan of the Turkish Government to grub up Gezi Park in order to build a 
new mosque, a series of protests against Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan 
began in Istanbul. The PM was criticized for his pro-Islamist propaganda 
during his two mandates.8 
What initially began as an environmentalist movement in the 
Taksim Square was subsequently expanded in 79 of the 81 provinces of 
Turkey. Police estimated that 3.5 million people took part in the protests 
known as the “Gezi Resistance”.9 The authorities’ response to this 
democratic civil initiative was brutal. The Turkish Police aggressively 
reacted to these peaceful demonstrations, using tear gas and water cannons 
in a non-discriminatory manner on citizens to restore order. Figures from an 
Amnesty International report show that about 6,000 demonstrators were 
indicted with charges such as participation in unauthorized protests, 
resistance to the police, damaging public property, helping the wounded, 
exchange of information and opinions about the protests on social media 
networks, and even terrorist offenses.10 Following the intervention of the 
authorities, 11 people were killed and more than 8000 were seriously 
                                                           
8 Gezi Direnişi Zaman Çizelgesi, May 27th 2013, accessed  on  June 13th 2017 at  
https://line.do/tr/gezi-direnisi-zaman-cizelgesi/3to/vertical. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 ***, “Adding Injustice to Injury,  One  year  on  from  the  Gezi  Park  Protests  in  
Turkey”, Amnesty    International,    June  4th 2014, accessed on June 9th 2017 at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/adding-injustice-injury-one-year-
after-gezi-park-protests-2014-06-04. 
Cezarina Chirică RJHIS 4 (3) 2017 
Propaganda and Manipulation in History. An 
Interdisciplinary Approach 
 
 
 
14 
 
injured. Subsequently, the Turkish government has banned public 
gatherings in Taksim Square.11 
Over the years, the Turkish government maintained its influence 
over the media by suspending media groups critical of the government 
through heavy fines and by reselling them to companies that were 
supportive of the AKP and Erdoğan.12 In turn, the government rewarded 
these companies by providing them long term government contracts. This 
was the case for the most dominant media groups in Turkey, Sabah-ATV 
and Doğan Media Group, as the AKP realized after its second reelection 
that it needed its own propaganda apparatus in order to promote itself and a 
way to silence critical voices from the opposition. 
In a speech delivered on June 6th 2013, PM Erdoğan did not seem at 
all affected by the violent protests, answering journalists in an aggressive 
manner: 
 
Demands cannot be made through illegal means. If you say: 'I will hold a 
meeting and burn and destroy', we will not allow that. We are against the 
majority dominating the minority and we cannot tolerate the opposite.13 
 
For many Turks who protested against Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
his Cabinet, media silence equated to practical censorship in the ten-year 
term of office of the Ankara Executive. During the Gezi protests, t-shirts, 
                                                           
11 Ibidem. 
12 Ahmet Insel, Turcia lui Erdoğan. Între visul democraţiei şi tentaţia autoritară, 
Bucureşti, Ed. Corint, 2017, p. 56. 
13 ***, “Erdogan defies Turkish protesters”, The Guardian, June 6th 2013, accessed on 
June 16th 2017 at   http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/erdogan-defies-
turkish-protesters-live. 
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hats and penguin suits filled the streets, and the penguin became a symbol 
of the protesters’ frustration and Turkish media’s self-censorship efforts, 
after one of the country's main news television stations, CNN Turk, 
broadcasted a documentary about penguins during the violent clashes 
between demonstrators and law enforcements. At the same time, the 
national news channel, NTV, chose to broadcast a cooking show. “Our 
audience felt betrayed”,14 Cem Aydin, executive director of NTV, said after 
a meeting with his staff. After the meeting, many anchors resigned as a 
protest against the intentional ignorance of the events in the country. A 
survey by Bilgi University specialists showed that 84% of people who 
walked the streets of Istanbul said they were dissatisfied with the lack of 
media coverage of events in Taksim Square and other public areas.15 
Over the years, Erdoğan has made a habit of denigrating the media 
every week in the General Assembly during his televised speech. Whatever 
issue was on top of the agenda in Turkey, he always expressed his 
discontent with the media, targeting individual columnists and media 
owners alike. His targets sometimes included international outlets as well. 
During his second mandate, he condemned CNN, BBC, and Reuters for 
their Gezi Park coverage.16 
                                                           
14 ***, “Taksim Square story exposes flaws and threats for Turkey’s media”, Huffington 
Post, accessed on June 23rd 2017 at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/committee-to-protect-
journalists/taksim-square-story-expos_b_3405021.html. 
15 Freedom House, Turkey - Freedom of the Press 2014, accessed on June 21st 2017 at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/turkey. 
16 ***, “Survey Reveals That Journalists Recognize Media Censorship”, Hürriyet Daily 
News, published on August 10th 2013, accessed on June 23rd 2017 at 
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One of the main complaints of the Gezi demonstrators was precisely 
the restriction of press freedom, alongside the increasingly authoritarian and 
Islamic position of the Ankara government. Critics say Erdoğan’s 
government has tried to control the media by introducing very high tax rates 
and confiscating the assets of the news trusts that are critical to his 
administration. Those who own many of the media companies also have 
businesses in other sectors of activity, such as energy, banking or mining. 
The government denied any political motivation in initiatives that hindered 
the management of media organizations. One thing, however, is certain: 
many of the press companies have adopted, over time, a more respectful 
and even more obedient attitude towards government policies, especially if 
they held television stations. Moreover, controversial journalists, 
considered “troublesome”, were forced to resign quietly, unsuitable news 
was tuned down, and Erdoğan sued the caricaturists and journalists who 
criticized him.17 
The Gezi Resistance marked a milestone for the independent media 
in Turkey. Although it will take years before they establish themselves as 
true alternatives, this breaking news moment provided a perfect opportunity 
for them to get brand recognition. For example, Halk TV, a mostly ignored 
news network affiliated with Turkey’s main opposition party, has emerged 
almost out of nowhere as the most watched news channel, merely for 
covering the protests. Sozcu, a twenty-page sensational daily lacking 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=survey-reveals-that-journalists-recognize-
media-censorship-2013-08-10. 
17 Andrew Finkel, Turkey. What Everyone Needs to Know, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2012, p. 51. 
RJHIS 4 (3) 2017 
Propaganda and Manipulation in History. 
An Interdisciplinary Approach  
 
 
 
17 
 
fundamentals such as a newsroom, increased its circulation by more than 
fifty thousand after the massive protests, surpassing Hürriyet. 
But the Gezi Park protests also led to unprecedented mass firings, 
exemplifying the AKP’s increasing suppression of the media. The total 
number of journalists fired due to coverage of the protests varies as the Gezi 
firings have continued throughout the fall of 2013. The Turkish Journalists’ 
Union reported 59 fired journalists on July 26th 2013, but other media 
employees cite much higher numbers.18 When NTV Tarih, a history 
magazine owned by NTV, published a special “Gezi Edition”, the entire 
staff was dismissed and the magazine closed down. Even after the protests 
in November, TRT news owner fired two employees who had supported the 
protests via social media. However, the AKP and its supporters claim that 
the firings are not related to coverage of the Gezi protests. Can Dündar from 
Milliyet, one of Turkey’s most prominent columnists, was also fired as a 
result of the Gezi protests. After his columns were not published for weeks, 
the owner of Milliyet informed him of his dismissal in a phone call. Dündar 
wrote on his personal blog, “I was expecting it for a long time, it wasn’t a 
surprise... I’m not the first and I won’t be the last.”19 
Another example of mass propaganda was the fact that after tens of 
thousands of people went to Istanbul's Taksim Square, on the front page of 
Sabah, one of the best-selling newspapers in Turkey, Prime Minister 
                                                           
18 Human Rights Watch, Silencing Turkey’s Media. The Government’s Deepening Assault 
on Critical Journalism, accessed on June 26th 2017 at 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/15/silencing-turkeys-media/governments-deepening-
assault-critical-journalism. 
19 Ibidem. 
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Erdoğan was praised for his campaign against smoking. Sabah is owned by 
Calik Holding, a group whose executive chief is Erdoğan’s son-in-law. 
The large number of imprisoned journalists in Turkey is a direct 
consequence of overly broad anti-terrorism laws, including Article 314 of 
the Turkish Criminal Code20 and the Turkish Anti-Terror Law. For 
example, the Turkish Anti-Terror Law makes it a crime to “print or publish 
declarations or announcements of terrorist organizations.”21 The nature of 
these poorly-defined laws leaves them exposed to abuse by prosecutors and 
judges, who have aggressively applied them through their own 
interpretation.22  
Furthermore, the denunciation of journalists in Turkey indicates the 
flaws of the Turkish legal system in addition to the government’s 
willingness to use the courts to imprison critical voices of Turkish society. 
In 2014, Freedom House reported that there are more than 4,000 lawsuits 
pending against journalists in Turkey.23  
Nevertheless, while the media has fallen rapidly, social networks 
have thrived. Turkey's protests are largely coordinated through Twitter and 
Facebook, where the Turks are the fourth largest community in the world. 
                                                           
20 ***, Penal Code of Turkey, accessed on June 19th 2017 at 
http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6453/file/Turkey_CC_2004_am201
6_en.pdf.  
21 ***, Anti-Terror Law, Act No. 3713: Law to Fight Terrorism, accessed on June 19th 
2017 at http://www.opbw.org/nat_imp/leg_reg/turkey/anti-terror.pdf. 
22 Max Hoffman, Michael Werz, Freedom of the Press, Center for American Progress, 
May 14th 2013, accessed on June 21st 2017 at https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/TurkeyPressFreedom.pdf.  
23 Freedom House, Turkey - Freedom of the Press 2014, accessed on June 21st 2017 at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/turkey. 
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“Social networks are extremely important in our work. It is the way we 
disseminate information”24 says one of the first activists who set up their 
camp in Gezi Park in Istanbul. According to a study published on June 1st, 
after the midnight of May 31st, more than 3,000 tweets were made per 
minute from the Turkish Twitter accounts. What is unique in this particular 
case is how Twitter was used to disseminate information about ground 
demonstrations. About 90% of all tweets came from citizens residing in 
Turkey, the rest being signs of solidarity with Turkish people living outside 
the country. As the Turkish press did not escape the control of Erdoğan’s 
government, nor were the actions on social networks overlooked. Erdoğan 
classified Twitter as a “threat”25 and, moreover, the Izmir police detained 
25 people accused of using social networks to spread false information 
about the anti-government protests. In this way, Erdoğan tried to suppress 
criticism with the propaganda machinery running at full speed. 
Democracy means the rule of the people. As a result, when 
corporate interests and religious misconceptions begin to dominate the 
Government, we can no longer speak of a democracy. In fact, when only a 
limited elite of elected politicians is delegated to speak for the rest, it no 
longer represents the rule of the people, but of its representation.  
During the protests in Gezi, people did not just oppose to the 
physical destruction of the park for the economic and spiritual gain of the 
government, but also stood against the idea of being deprived of spaces in 
                                                           
24 ***, “Gezi Direnişi Zaman Çizelgesi”, Line.do.tr, May 27th 2013, accessed on  June 
13th 2017 at  https://line.do/tr/gezi-direnisi-zaman-cizelgesi/3to/vertical. 
25 Ahmet Insel, op. cit., p. 58. 
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which to publicly express their ideas, opinions, anger, and dissatisfaction. 
German philosopher Axel Honneth defined the public sphere as “the place 
of social struggles and oppositions, not a homogeneous and unitary 
space.”26 This definition reflects the state of public space in Turkey during 
the Resistance in Gezi. Therefore, it is important to see that the struggle 
during the June Resistance is at the same time a struggle for claiming the 
public sphere by mobilizing the citizens. 
In “The Open Society and Its Enemies”, Karl Popper supported the 
idea of an open society as a means of defending against totalitarianism, 
redefining the concept of democracy in a rather arbitrary way. In short, 
Popper proposed redefining democracy as “a barrier against tyranny.”27 The 
Turks tried the same thing during the 2013 protests: the overthrow of the 
one who could cause  the  most  damage to society. Democracies regard 
dictatorships and tyranny as irresponsible and, as a result of people 
tolerating them, they only become an accessory to injustice. Therefore, the 
Turks refused to be accomplices in the antidemocratic slippages of their 
country and counteracted their own direct democracy to the pretend 
democracy proposed by Erdoğan’s authoritarian neoliberal state. 
Although Erdoğan claimed to aspire to Western standards, under his 
rule Turkey became an eurosceptic state that still gives signs of a return to 
Islamic values. Moreover, as a result of the government's actions against the 
demonstrators, both the European Commission and the European 
                                                           
26 Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 19. 
27 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
2013, p. 73. 
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Parliament intensified their opposition to Turkey's efforts to join the 
European Union. Limiting freedom of expression and non-observance of 
the citizens’ right to protest have prompted European officials to draw the 
attention of the Turkish Government to the continuation of the reform 
process in order to maintain these rights and freedoms in conformity with 
the values of the Union. 
 
The Consequences of Free Speech: The Reprehension of Orhan Pamuk 
and Elif Shafak 
 
“A sword won't cut without inspiration from the pen.” (Turkish saying) 
 
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code punishes any public insult to 
the Turkish nation, state, government or parliament, with imprisonment 
between 6 months and up to 3 years.28 If the Turkish denigrator happens to 
be in another country, the penalty increases by one third. So far, both Orhan 
Pamuk (winner of the 2006 Nobel prize in Literature) and Elif Shafak 
(Turkey’s most admired female novelist) have been accused under Article 
301, but have not been convicted due to lack of evidence.  
Orhan Pamuk was accused of publicly denigrating Turkish identity 
after an interview he gave to the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger in 
February 2005 in which he made the following statement: 
                                                           
28 ***, Penal Code of Turkey, accessed on June 19th 2017 at 
http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/6453/file/Turkey_CC_2004_am201
6_en.pdf. 
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Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands 
and nobody dares to talk about it. Therefore, I do. And the nationalists hate 
me for that.29 
 
His trial began on December 16th 2005 and by the end of January 
2006, the Ministry of Justice dropped the charges arguing that “the 
amended Penal Code does not authorise a criminal proceeding”.30  
The fact that Pamuk won the Nobel Prize that same year has turned 
him into a spokesman for the Armenian cause and, at the same time, he 
became one of the first targets of the Turkish government in its fight against 
freedom of speech. The campaign against him intensified so much that 
Pamuk had to leave the country. He did not celebrate the fact that he was at 
that time the first Nobel laureate in Turkey because his works were burned 
in the streets at nationalist marches all over the country. 
For years, Pamuk refused to talk about politics. Not only for his own 
safety, but the expectations that he should represent all the progressive 
political causes in Turkey were overwhelming. “Not only do I have to fight 
the government, but I have to be careful of what the people want”31, he said 
in an interview with Agence France-Presse. Not many authors have dared to 
oppose such censorship, which is why a lot of people expected Pamuk to 
                                                           
29 ***, The Case of Orhan Pamuk, English Pen, published on December 15th 2005, 
accessed on June 14th 2017 at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2005/12/15/the-case-of-
orhan-pamuk/.  
30 The Kurdish Human Rights Project, Freedom of Expression in Turkey, last updated on 
July 2006, accessed on June 14th 2017 at 
file://Freedom%20of%20expression%20briefing%20paper.pdf. 
31 Philippe Alfroy, Orhan Pamuk - Anxious Observer of the New Turkey, published on 
February 15th 2015, accessed on June 13th 2017 at https://www.dawn.com/news/1163604.  
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stand for this cause. “I've sometimes even worked for six years on a book, 
but the only thing journalists wanted was to talk about Islamism.”32 
More recently, Orhan Pamuk was surprised to note that the 
interview given to Hürriyet, explaining the reasons for his opposition to the 
measures taken by AKP, did not appear on the journal’s pages. In the 
interview, Pamuk said he would vote “No” at the referendum on amending 
the Constitution which was held in Turkey on 16 April 2017. He accused 
the newspaper, known to be close to the Turkish government, of refusing to 
publish the interview due to political interests. The Hürriyet, which is part 
of the Doğan Holding Press Trust, has abstained at the moment from 
commenting on the writer's accusations. This episode illustrates very well 
the self-censorship of the Turkish press and the growing pressures on the 
media, especially after the AKP came to power. Pamuk is one of the most 
prominent critics of the regime imposed by Erdoğan, his postures disturbing 
both politicians and Islamists over time. 
“The Bastard of Istanbul” is the novel for which Elif Shafak was 
accused of “denigrating Turkishness”, according to art. 301 of the Turkish 
Penal Code. The accusations were based on the words of one of her 
fictional characters. She risked being sentenced to three years in prison, but 
the charges have been eventually withdrawn in September 2006, due to lack 
of evidence.33 The political substrate of the book, which Shafak manages to 
capture quite well in analyzing the connection between the 
                                                           
32 Ibidem. 
33 Richard Lea, “Aquittal for Turkish Novelist”, The Guardian, published on September 
21st 2006, accessed on June 19th 2017 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2006/sep/21/turkey.world. 
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Tchakhmakhchian family (Armenian) and the Kazanci family (Turkish), is 
the Armenian genocide of 1915, which has not yet been recognized by 
Turkey. The book is significant for having drawn attention to the 
assassinations and to the Turks' inconclusiveness towards them, and for 
what it has divulged about freedom of speech.  
Nine years after this episode, Elif Shafak has begun receiving 
threats following an exclusive interview for Der Spiegel. 
 
SPIEGEL: Many in Europe are unsure how to view Erdoğan. Is he an 
authoritarian ruler, an Islamist, a nationalist or a failed democrat?  
Shafak: I would call him an authoritarian politician who is very divisive. 
This is a society of the baba, the father, the patriarch. It starts in the family, 
continues at school, on the street. In every aspect of life, including football, 
the Turkish society is baba-oriented. And our mentality in politics is not that 
different. I think this is a big part of the problem: Our politics is very 
masculine, very aggressive, and it's very polarizing. And the pace of this 
development has increased in recent years. Erdoğan is, in my eyes, the most 
polarizing politician in recent Turkish political history.34 
 
SPIEGEL: If Turkey is like Russia, are there also similarities between 
Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin?  
Shafak: Erdoğan has changed a lot since he came to power. In the 
beginning, he used to talk about being all-embracing. No longer. It's no 
secret that he wants to change the constitution in order to have a presidential 
system, and I am sure he will do everything he can to get there. I am very 
worried about this concentration of power, and it's not only because 
of Erdoğan. We have the ballot box, but we don't have the culture of 
democracy. The government says: You see, we have the majority, we're 
entitled to do anything we want. But that's not democracy, that's 
majoritarianism.35 
 
                                                           
34 Juliane von Mittelstaedt, Christoph Scheuermann, We’ve Forgotten How to Laugh, 
published on December 10th 2015, accessed on June 14th 2017 at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkish-author-elif-shafak-on-society-under-
erdogan-a-1066223.html.  
35 Ibidem. 
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 In Shafak’s opinion, the situation of the Turkish press shouldn’t 
be overlooked. Given that there have been numerous abuses in Turkey, 
under the leadership of Erdoğan, who is increasingly taking in power, there 
is a need for a voice to present the truth behind the political game. The 
Turkish territory becomes inaccessible to the national and international 
press, whose only task will be to reflect the events from the outside. 
In a public petition, more than 80 writers, intellectuals and artists in 
Turkey have expressed concern about the polarization of Turkish society 
following the rhetoric of the government led by Recep Erdoğan, saying that 
the law on “denigrating Turkishness” is an insult to free expression.  
A month after the Gezi protests broke out across the country, 
Turkish intellectuals warn of the dangers of increasing polarization and 
tension in Turkey. Thus, a hundred personalities, including writers and 
artists, signed the petition published as an advertising page in most local 
newspapers last Saturday. Named “Kaygiliyiz” which means “We are 
concerned”, the petition took a plea against what they called “deep divisions 
that form inside of the society”.36 
“There is a surge of rage and hate in the air, and there are persistent 
attempts to underestimate, attack, insult, accuse and stop artists.”37 
Although it does not explicitly refer to the government, the text makes it 
clear to understand who is the one targeted, given that a note from a 
statement by Erdoğan appears in it. 
                                                           
36 Ugur Cakan, “Kaygılı ve endişeli misiniz?”, Change.org, accessed on June 23rd 2017 at 
https://www.change.org/p/ayd%C4%B1n-sanat%C3%A7%C4%B1-ve-akademisyenler-
kayg%C4%B1l%C4%B1-ve-endi%C5%9Feli-misiniz. 
37 Ibidem. 
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Turkey is a country where a single tweet against the government is 
enough for a sentence of months in prison. Foreign journalists begin to be 
traced if they come from big cities. Every contact is kept under observation 
and Turkish collaborators risk arrest and even their lives if they choose to 
help. “Erdoğan cannot tolerate that a foreign newspaper can offer a different 
version of reality and characterizes it as corrupt and malicious.”38 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Still in the process of joining the European Union, Turkey seems to 
simulate its fundamental values, such as the rule of law and freedom of 
expression, perpetuating an authoritarian regime in which rights exist only 
in theory. This was materialized in the status of the European press gulag 
won by the Turkish state, according to the Reporters Without Borders 
report. In their ranking, Turkey ranks 155 out of 180 in terms of media 
freedom in the world.39 At the moment, there are 240 arrested, 24 convicted 
and 109 wanted journalists in Turkey.40 Another way of oppressing the 
press can be noticed by the fact that it only reflects the position of the 
                                                           
38 Juliane von Mittelstaedt, Christoph Scheuermann, We’ve Forgotten How to Laugh, 
published on December 10th 2015, accessed on June 14th 2017 at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkish-author-elif-shafak-on-society-under-
erdogan-a-1066223.html. 
39 Reporters Without Borders, Turkey 2017, accessed on June 23rd 2017 at 
https://rsf.org/en/turkey. 
40 Stockholm Center for Freedom, Freedom of the Press in Turkey, accessed on June 23rd 
2017 at http://stockholmcf.org/updated-list/. 
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government, while the impartiality and objectivity are being removed by a 
regime that turns more authoritative day after day. 
The failed state coup on July 15th 2016 led to the dismissal of 2,500 
media employees, the closure of 130 media outlets, the arrest or detention 
of over 200 journalists.41 Around 50,000 people were arrested or suspended 
from office in a despotic attempt to neutralize supporters of Erdoğan's 
political opponent, cleric Fethullah Gülen - suspected of being behind the 
coup. Moreover, the state of emergency on July 15th was maintained for 
about six months and the suspension of applying the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights was ordered. These facts can only 
prove how precarious the concept of democracy in Turkey is, regardless of 
the attempts of this state to imitate the European model. 
President Erdoğan, who has been warring for years with the press, 
has become less and less tolerant of criticism from public opinion, thus 
censorship and pressures on journalists, and the persecution of political 
opponents became a constant government policy. According to figures 
published by the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, the number of 
journalists in prison now stands at 240, with Turkey “rivaling” with China 
and Iran in the category of respect for freedom of expression. 
In Turkey, each electoral period is marked by increased censorship 
and media abuse. Reactions from government officials of the United States 
and the European Union are not delayed, but without too much effect on 
Erdoğan's conduct. Turkey is the keystone of power and stability in the 
                                                           
41 Ahmet Insel, op. cit., p. 102. 
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Middle East, the main organizing factor of the region's geography and 
politics, so great Western chancellors rarely allow themselves to adopt a 
position that could harm the “Turkish partner”. 
The post-Gezi experience had contradictory impacts. On the one 
hand, the government revealed the fear of autonomous press and, on the 
other hand, previously unconnected civilian groups in Turkey formed new 
alliances. This development was an important and valuable experience from 
the Gezi protests and provided new opportunities for mobilizing activism in 
Turkey. 
 It should be noted that through measures such as imprisoning 
journalists, cartoonists, photographers and the restrictions on accessing 
certain sites (such as Twitter, Facebook or Youtube), Turkey is moving 
away from the goal of EU integration. Freedom of expression must be 
respected in order for a democracy to function effectively. 
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